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Higher corporate taxes are often argued to depress wages (a tax incidence effect), 
while higher wages may require compensation via lower  corporate tax rates (a 
fiscal compensation effect). Yet, existing empirical evidence ignores that i) both 
effects are likely to occur simultaneously (necessitating a joint estimation approach), 
and ii) capital mobility might play a critical moderating role for the strength of both 
effects. Using a panel dataset comprising 24 OECD countries over the period 1982-
2007, we address both these deficiencies. This clearly illustrates the simultaneous  
existence of tax incidence and fiscal compensation effects. Moreover, capital 
mobility (and the ensuing relative bargaining power of economic agents) has a 
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Higher corporate taxes are often argued to depress wages (a tax incidence effect), while 
higher wages may require compensation via lower corporate tax rates (a fiscal compensation 
effect). Yet, existing empirical evidence ignores that i) both effects are likely to occur 
simultaneously (necessitating a joint estimation approach), and ii) capital mobility might play 
a critical moderating role for the strength of both effects. Using a panel dataset comprising 
24 OECD countries over the period 1982-2007, we address both these deficiencies. This 
clearly illustrates the simultaneous existence of tax incidence and fiscal compensation effects. 
Moreover, capital mobility (and the ensuing relative bargaining power of economic agents) 
has a significant influence on both the prevalence and strength of these effects. 
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I. Introduction 
A substantial literature going back to at least Harberger (1962) argues that corporate taxes 
exert a negative impact on wages as long as the capital supply is not completely inelastic (i.e. 
a tax incidence effect; Harberger, 1962, 1995). A more recent literature suggests that the 
causal connection between corporate taxes and wages might well be reversed because 
governments could have an incentive to compensate firms for high labor costs by reducing 
corporate taxes (Haufler and Mittermaier, 2011; Exbrayat et al., 2012; Mittermaier and 
Rincke, 2013). While not denying the relevance of tax incidence effects, casual observation 
appears to corroborate the existence of such fiscal compensation effects. For instance, the UK 
instituted a national minimum wage in 1998, and simultaneously introduced substantial cuts 
in its corporate income tax rate. The same pattern – i.e. a decrease in corporate taxation 
following an increase in the minimum wage level – also materialized in several Canadian 
provinces (including British Columbia and Ontario) and the United States (where president 
Bush conditioned his support for a minimum wage increase in May 2007 on business tax 
breaks). Hence, it appears that “fiscal policies are used to compensate investors for the 
location disadvantages of facing high wages” (Haufler and Mittermaier, 2011, 795).  
 
Thus far, empirical analyses of the tax-wage relation assess either corporate tax incidence on 
wages (Randolph, 2006; Desai et al., 2007; Felix and Hines, 2009; Dwenger et al., 2011; 
Arulampalam et al., 2012; Fuest et al., 2012; Clausing, 2013) or fiscal compensation for 
higher wage costs (Mittermaier and Rincke, 2013), and ignore the potential bi-directional 
nature of this relation. The first contribution of this article therefore lies in simultaneously 
testing for both a tax incidence and a fiscal compensation effect in a dataset comprising 24 
OECD countries over the period 1982-2007. Although previous studies control for reverse 
causality using, for instance, instrumental variables techniques, our simultaneous estimation 
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of both relations is important since the bi-directional, negative relationship between corporate 
taxes and wages suggested in the theoretical literature can only be accommodated via such an 
approach.  
 
Our second, and arguably more important, contribution lies in extending the existing 
empirical literature via the first evaluation of the moderating role of capital mobility for both 
tax incidence and fiscal compensation effects. With respect to the fiscal compensation effect, 
economic theory provides a clear prediction. As the risk of capital outflows becomes more 
prominent with the integration of global economies, the potential negative effects of rising 
wage costs (including capital outflows, or reduced inflows) strengthen with increasing capital 
mobility. This is likely to make rational governments more inclined to provide compensation 
for high wages through the corporate tax system – for instance, by implementing 
compensating corporate tax discounts (Haufler and Mittermaier, 2011; Exbrayat et al., 2012).  
 
With respect to the tax incidence effect, it is important to take into account the exact nature of 
the wage setting process. In the presence of a wage bargaining process, a so-called direct tax 
incidence arises because corporate taxation reduces the quasi-rent over which workers and 
firms can bargain. Arulampalam et al. (2012) and Fuest et al. (2012) show that an 
improvement in the relative bargaining power of firms weakens this direct tax incidence effect 
(because workers capture a smaller share of the quasi-rent). Capital mobility plays no role in 
their models because the bargaining power and position of firms and workers are exogenous 
to the level of economic integration. However, as first shown by Dinopoulos and Mezzeti 
(1991), a credible threat to shift production abroad improves the bargaining position of the 
firm, and reduces the negotiated wage (see also Zhao, 1995; Eckel and Egger, 2009). As this 
is particularly relevant for multinational firms that can easily shift production across borders 
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(Eckel and Egger, 2009),1 we could expect direct tax incidence to increase with economic 
integration (or, at least, corporate internationalization). In the presence of competitive labor 
markets, the incidence of the corporate tax on wages is indirect and results from variations in 
the level of capital-to-labor invested in each country. As shown by Harberger (1995), an 
increase in capital mobility in such a setting allows capital owners to partially escape taxation 
via investments in low-tax countries. This capital outflow from a high tax country strengthens 
indirect tax incidence by reducing the marginal productivity of labor in this country.  
 
Overall, therefore, capital mobility and corporate internationalization could strengthen the 
interrelations between wages and corporate taxes (either directly or through its influence on 
the wage bargaining process). We test this intuition by analyzing how economic openness as 
well as the bargaining power of workers relative to firms influence both the tax incidence and 
fiscal compensation effects. 
 
In the next section, we briefly discuss the existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
corporate tax incidence and fiscal compensation, and thereby highlight the potential role of 
capital mobility on both effects. Then, section III presents our methodological approach and 
main empirical results. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Literature Overview and Hypotheses 
II.a Corporate tax incidence on wages 
Corporate taxes can be passed on to workers by lowering wages. This can arise via various 
mechanisms depending on the time horizon and the labor market structure. The overall 
incidence of the corporate tax on wages can be decomposed into a direct effect in the short-
                                                 
1 For example, Goodyear decided to fall back on imports from subsidiaries abroad after a major strike of 
steelworkers in the US and Canada in 2006 in order to limit the harmful impact of these strikes on production. 
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run and an indirect effect in the long-run (Arulampalam et al., 2012; Fuest et al., 2012). The 
direct effect captures the incidence of the corporate tax on wages in the presence of a wage 
bargaining process, for given capital stock and output prices. Specifically, a rise in corporate 
taxation depresses wages by reducing the quasi-rent over which workers and firm can bargain. 
In the long-run, however, corporate taxes also influence wages through the adjustment of the 
capital stock per worker or output prices (known as the indirect tax incidence effect). This 
arises because the corporate tax first exerts a negative influence on capital investment, which 
reduces the capital-to-labor ratio. This, in turn, reduces the marginal productivity of labor, and 
the resulting wages, in the presence of competitive labor markets. 
 
The earliest literature regarding corporate tax incidence was devoted to indirect tax incidence 
in a competitive economy. In his pioneering contribution, Harberger (1962) develops a 
closed-economy model with a perfectly competitive corporate and a non-corporate sector. He 
concludes that corporate taxation drives down the post-tax return to capital, which is fully 
borne by all capital owners under various circumstances.2 This result, however, crucially 
depends on the elasticity of capital supply, which is assumed to be fixed in his closed-
economy framework. Extending the model to an open-economy framework, Harberger (1995) 
illustrates that the burden of a corporate tax can in some cases be fully shifted onto workers. 
The reason is that in an open economy, capital supply becomes elastic at the country level, 
which equalizes the net return to capital just as international trade equalizes the prices of 
tradable goods.3 As capital will now (at least partly) move out of the country when it is taxed, 
                                                 
2  The standard example taken by Harberger (1962) is an economy where production is determined by a Cobb-
Douglas function and expenditures are divided among both goods in given proportions. Under such 
circumstances, consumers who spend a larger share of their budget on the corporate good will suffer losses that 
are exactly compensated by the gains for consumers who prefer the non-corporate good. Consequently, on 
average, only capital owners bear the tax burden. 
3 Other assumptions can be relaxed in general equilibrium models considering open economies.  See Gravelle 
(2013) for a survey of the literature. 
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the capital flows reduce (resp. increase) the capital-to-labor ratio and the resulting competitive 
wages in high-tax (resp. low-tax) countries.4 
 
From an empirical perspective, a first strand of the literature building on Harberger’s (1962, 
1995) insights tries to quantify this indirect incidence of the corporate tax burden in the long 
run. Randolph (2006), for instance, simulates a general equilibrium model à la Harberger 
(1995, 2006) under the assumptions that the worldwide capital stock is fixed and the US 
accounts for 30% of world capital, and finds that labor bears 70% of the US corporate income 
tax. In the presence of capital flows impeded by imperfect substitutability of products 
between countries, the simulations of Gravelle and Smetters (2006) conclude that labor bears 
less than 70% of the burden. However, Clausing (2013) argues that these early analyses do 
not rigorously test the general equilibrium mechanism underlying indirect tax incidence, and 
that their findings are sensitive to a number of key economic parameters. Therefore, most 
recent studies rely on econometrics to test the indirect incidence of the corporate tax in open 
economies. For example, using data on the foreign activities of American multinational firms 
for a panel of more than 50 countries between 1989 and 2004, Desai et al. (2007) jointly 
estimate the degree to which owners of capital and labor share the burdens of corporate 
income taxes, with the restriction that the overall burden is ultimately shared between them. 
The results suggest that 45 to 75 percent of the burden of corporate taxes is borne by labor. 
Other cross-country studies relying on a single-equation regression (Felix, 2007; Hasset and 
Mathur, 2010) likewise provide evidence that increases in the corporate tax rate significantly 
reduce wages. By contrast, Clausing (2013) finds an ambiguous and small impact of corporate 
taxes on wages using a vector autoregression model. 
 
                                                 
4  Consumers in this set-up also bear part of the burden of the corporate tax in non-tradable sectors as prices will 
continue to vary in these sectors. 
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Studies focusing on the direct incidence of the corporate tax generally rely on reduced-form 
regression analyses. Using data on the union-wage premium in the US, Felix and Hines 
(2009) estimate that workers in a fully-unionized firm capture 54% of the benefits of low tax 
rates. Arulampalam et al. (2012) estimate the direct incidence of corporate income taxation by 
controlling for the influence on wages of the value-added per worker. Using micro-data on 
nine European countries over the period 1996-2003, they find that a rise of 1$ in taxes would 
reduce the wage bill by 49 cents. Dwenger et al. (2011, 3) use data on all employees on the 
Social Security payroll in Germany between 1998 and 2006. Controlling for the adjustment in 
employment induced by changes in wages and the user cost of capital, they find that an 
increase of corporate tax revenues by 1 Euro reduces the wage bill by 0.47 Euro. Besides 
controlling for the level of factor inputs, Fuest et al. (2012, 3) compare the level of tax 
incidence depending on whether or not firms are covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
Using panel of data on German local tax rates linked to matched employer-employee data, 
they find “a full incidence, consisting of the direct and indirect effect, of 77 cents”. They also 
illustrate that this result is mostly driven by the direct effect. 
 
II.b Fiscal compensation for high labor costs 
Recent theoretical work suggests that high (low) taxes might not only lead to low (high) 
wages, but that wage levels might also influence corporate taxation. Let us again first consider 
a closed economy with imperfectly competitive good markets. In such a setting, higher wages 
can be partially passed on to consumers through higher prices, which reduces consumers’ 
surplus (Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, 2003). Even with perfectly competitive labor markets 
ensuring full employment, benevolent governments could then be tempted to compensate 
firms (via lower taxes) for high wage costs to limit the detrimental effect on consumers’ 
surplus. Such a compensatory tax policy turns out to be even more likely in an open economy. 
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As the tax competition literature shows, capital mobility might lead governments to behave 
strategically and engage in a race-to-the bottom (in terms of corporate taxation) to protect 
their country from capital outflows (for a survey, see Wilson, 1999; recent empirical evidence 
is provided in Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 2011). As shown by, for instance, 
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005), such strategic tax setting is expected to be stronger in 
countries that are structurally less attractive. In this respect, production costs also matter as 
these are detrimental to firms’ competitiveness. Hence, this gives an additional reason for 
offering corporate tax discounts by governments keen to limit capital outflows.  
 
This idea was recently rationalized in partial equilibrium models of tax competition with 
unionized labor markets by Haufler and Mittermaier (2011) and Exbrayat et al. (2012). These 
authors analyze how wage setting influences corporate taxes through international capital 
flows. When investors can choose among a unionized and a non-unionized country (in which 
wages are relatively lower), the government of the unionized country in equilibrium sets a 
lower corporate tax (or a higher subsidy) to compensate firms for the higher wage caused by 
union power. Therefore, in an economy characterized by mobile capital and immobile labor, 
the labor cost exerts a negative influence on the corporate tax rate at the national level. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one empirical analysis of such fiscal compensation 
effect. Mittermaier and Rincke (2013) use European data over the period 1982-2000 to 
explore the impact of relative wages (or a labor cost disadvantage with respect to other 
countries) on absolute levels of corporate taxation. According to their estimates, a 1$ increase 
in the compensation cost differential between countries triggers a cut of the statutory income 
tax by about 1%. Identification of the causal nature of this effect derives from an ingenious IV 
strategy exploiting the end of the Cold War. They do not, however, test the impact of absolute 
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labor costs on corporate taxation, evaluate the simultaneous presence of a tax incidence effect, 
nor assess the mediating role of capital mobility. 
 
II.c Hypotheses 
Theoretical work suggests a bi-directional relation between corporate taxes and wages. 
Moreover, empirical work has provided some substantiation for both tax incidence and fiscal 
compensation effects. As a direct result, it becomes important to account for this bi-
directional relationship to avoid biased inferences. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Tax incidence and fiscal compensation occur jointly. 
 
As discussed above, economic theory predicts that the indirect tax incidence and fiscal 
compensation effects become more prominent when capital supply is more elastic. Indeed, 
(financial) openness of the economy limits the variation of the net-return to capital following 
changes in corporate tax rates. This allows the burden of corporate taxation in a given country 
to be distributed between capital owners (through a lower return to capital), and workers 
(through lower wages) – causing a tax incidence effect (Harberger, 1995).5 Moreover, capital 
mobility strengthens the potential negative effects of increasing wage costs, which provides 
governments with a stronger incentive to implement compensating corporate tax discounts 
(Haufler and Mittermaier, 2011; Exbrayat et al., 2012).  
 
Recent theoretical work by Arulampalam et al. (2012) and Fuest et al. (2012), however, 
brings forward an alternative view for the direct tax incidence effect. Their models suggest 
                                                 
5  Harberger (1995) also analyzes how economic openness on both product and capital markets shapes the 
incidence of corporate taxation on consumers. He shows that the burden of corporate taxation in a given 
country should increase prices in the corporate non-tradable sector and decrease prices in the non-corporate 
non-tradable sector (especially in labor-intensive activities).  Economic openness on the capital and product 
markets should therefore also contribute to a fall in real wages in the corporate (e.g. manufacturing) sector. 
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that the direct tax incidence effect is increasing (resp. decreasing) with the relative bargaining 
power of workers (resp. firms). The intuition is the following. When workers have no 
bargaining power, the firm reduces their wages to the reservation wage and the quasi rent 
created in the firm will go to the firm’s owners. An increase in corporate taxes will then be 
fully borne by the firm because workers are at their reservation wage. When the relative 
bargaining power of workers rises and they capture more and more of the quasi-rent generated 
within the firm through higher wages, the firm can pass a larger proportion of any corporate 
tax increase onto them. While an interesting theoretical possibility, Arulampalam et al. (2012) 
themselves fail to substantiate this effect in their empirical analysis. Specifically, they show 
that the short-run elasticity of the wage rate to corporate taxes is equivalent between stand-
alone companies and firms that are part of a multinational group (which are assumed to enjoy 
stronger bargaining power relative to workers as they can shift production across borders). 
 
It should be noted, however, that Arulampalam et al. (2012) and Fuest et al. (2012) consider 
the bargaining power and position of firms and workers as exogenous in their models – rather 
than endogenous to the level of economic integration. This not only ignores that economic 
integration probably does affect these relative bargaining positions, but might also affect their 
theoretical predictions. Indeed, as first shown by Dinopoulos and Mezzeti (1991), a credible 
threat to shift production abroad improves the bargaining position of the firm and reduces the 
negotiated wage (see also Zhao, 1995; Eckel and Egger, 2009). This result is found to hold 
particularly for multinational firms that can more easily shift their production abroad (Eckel 
and Egger, 2009). Hence, the direct tax incidence may well be stronger in the presence of 
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endogenous production-shifting possibilities as it improves the bargaining position of firms 
compared to workers (Azémar and Hubbard, 2015).6 
 
H2: Capital mobility could strengthen both tax incidence and fiscal compensation 
effects.7 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
III.a Methodology and Data 
Studies of corporate tax incidence and fiscal compensation effects often rely on an 
instrumental variables approach to deal with potential endogeneity concerns. Yet, no study to 
date has taken supportive theoretical and empirical evidence for both effects (see above) as a 
cue to deal more directly with the simultaneity issue these results raise. In contrast, and using 
data from 24 OECD countries over a period covering up to 26 years (1982-2007),8 we 
explicitly evaluate the bi-directional nature of the negative relationship between corporate 
taxes and wages using the following reduced-from two-equation model (Data definitions, 
summary statistics and sources are in appendix):9 
 
                                                 
6 Note that Arulampalam et al.’s framework (2012) also includes a production shifting possibility (see above). 
Yet, in their model the resulting fall-back profit is exogenous while it is endogenous to the level of economic 
integration in Zhao (1995) and Eckel and Egger (2009). 
7 The opposing hypotheses inferred from existing theoretical work drive our careful phrasing here, as it implies 
that the role of capital mobility on direct tax incidence remains an empirical question. 
8 The sample of countries and time period analysed are both driven by data availability. The sample includes 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherland, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, and United States. The starting point of our dataset follows from the availability of corporate 
tax rate data (source: Loretz, 2008), while the endpoint is due to the lack of more recent data on some of our 
control variables. 
9 Our reduced-form approach implies an exclusive focus on direct tax incidence, and leaves aside any additional 
indirect effects (e.g., long-run effects arising through the adjustments of input levels or output prices). Such 
restriction naturally follows from the fact that workers’ bargaining power relative to that of firms – analysed in 
section III.c below – is most closely linked to the direct incidence of corporate taxation on workers (see 
above). 
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TAXi,t = i + 1 WAGEi,t + 2 Xi,t + 3 Yi,t + t + i,t (1) 
WAGEi,t = i + 1 TAXi,t + 2 Xi,t + 3 Zi,t + t + i,t (2) 
 
Our first dependent variable – TAXi,t – is the top statutory corporate income tax rate in country 
i at time t. The calculation of TAXi,t thereby accounts for the presence and level of local profit 
taxes, as well as their potential deduction from the national-level corporate income tax base 
(this approach follows Devereux et al., 2002; Loretz, 2008). Although the statutory tax rate 
does not include tax base effects and firms are likely to decide their investment decisions 
based on the entire tax schedule (i.e., tax base and tax rate), statutory tax rates are directly 
observable and most easily adjusted by the government. Hence, they are the most relevant 
measure of corporate tax policy for our purpose.10 Our second dependent variable – WAGEi,t – 
is measured as the real hourly compensation cost of production workers in the manufacturing 
sector in US dollars, obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. It includes total hourly 
direct pay, employer social security contributions and labor-related taxes on payrolls or 
employment (for details, see BLS, 2009). Like Mittermaier and Rincke (2013), we prefer this 
source to several other measures of compensations costs because the BLS data have been 
specifically created to allow evaluations of differences in employer labor costs across 
countries.  
 
Both equations include controls for a full set of time-specific (t) and country-specific (i) 
fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity across time and space, as well as a set of 
common control variables (Xi,t).
11 The latter includes – following earlier empirical work on 
tax incidence or fiscal compensation – the country’s unemployment rate, urbanness (measured 
                                                 
10 Nevertheless, for comparison and robustness, we ran our estimations also with the Effective Average Tax Rate 
(EATR) and the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) levied on machinery and buildings (see section III.d) 
(all tax data obtained from Loretz, 2008).  
11 As a robustness check, we also ran our regressions using country-specific period effects (see section III.d). 
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as the share of population in urban areas), trade openness (imports plus exports as a share of 
GDP), dependency ratio (share of under 14 and over 65 to working-age population), education 
(% school enrolment in tertiary education), union density (union membership as share of 
employment; taken from the OECD labour force statistics) and an indicator variable for 
membership of the European Union or its precursors. We furthermore include a number of 
control variables specific to either equation. For the TAX-equation, this supplementary 
control vector (Yi,t) is inspired by research in the vast tax competition literature (Devereux et 
al., 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 2011; Exbrayat and Geys, 2014) and includes total 
population size (in million people), political leaning of the government (1 if left-wing, 0 
otherwise), majority status of government (dummy = 1 if majority, 0 if minority) and public 
consumption (i.e., public sector size as a share of GDP in PPP). For the WAGE-equation, this 
supplementary control vector (Zi,t) includes a measure of worker’s productivity (i.e., GDP per 
person employed in constant 1990 US$ at PPP) and the number of working days lost due to 
strikes and lock-outs (obtained from the International Labor Organization).12  
 
As both equations include only a partially overlapping vector of exogenous variables, the 
system cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Instead, we rely on GLS 
estimation of a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Dwivedi and Srivastava, 
1978). In such an approach, the vectors of supplementary control variables (i.e., Yi,t and Zi,t) 
can be seen as ‘instruments’ for the identification of the endogenous variables (i.e., TAXi,t and 
WAGEi,t). The validity of our inferences thus to some extent depend on the reliability of the 
components of Yi,t and Zi,t as instruments. Valid inferences particularly require that the 
elements in Yi,t only affect the tax rate (and have no direct effect on wages), while the 
elements in Zi,t only affect wages (and have no direct effect on the tax rate). While this 
                                                 
12 Note that, as argued by Arulampalam et al. (2012), the variable for worker’s productivity is critical here, as it 
controls for (part of) the indirect incidence of the corporate tax. This also allows interpreting our results as 
estimates of only the direct tax incidence effect. 
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appears reasonable for most elements in Yi,t and Zi,t, one might argue that left-wing 
governments and government expenditures (both in Yi,t) directly influence wages. Auxiliary 
regressions suggest that this is not the case in our sample (details upon request), allowing their 
usage as instruments for the tax rate in the analysis below. Nonetheless, we should point out 
that including both these variables in Xi,t (rather than Yi,t) – and thus de facto excluding them 
from the instrument vector – leaves all inferences reported below unaffected (details upon 
request). More formal tests likewise support our instruments’ validity: i.e. Anderson’s 
canonical correlation LM test rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments for both the 
wage and tax equations (p<0.001 in both cases), while a Sargan test fails to substantiate that 
there is an overidentification problem (p<0.10 in both cases). 
 
III.b Baseline findings 
Our baseline findings – addressing hypothesis H1 – are summarized in Table 1. For 
comparison, and to obtain more information on the potential bias induced by ignoring the bi-
directional nature of the wage-tax relation, the first four columns present results using OLS, 
and the final two columns contain our preferred SUR results. Note that the second set of OLS 
results only differs from the first set in terms of the sample employed: it matches the sample 
used in the SUR regressions.13 Starting our discussion with a quick overview of the control 
variables in the TAX equation, we first of all observe that larger countries with a higher union 
density have higher statutory corporate tax rates. The former effect confirms that larger 
countries with a larger market can maintain higher taxes (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind et 
al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Exbrayat and Geys, 2014). To understand the latter 
effect, note that the union density variable captures the direct impact of unionization on 
                                                 
13 Note that the SUR estimates by construction exclude all observations with missing values for any variable 
included in either equation. The resulting sample is also employed in the second set of OLS results. The 
sample size in the first set of OLS estimates is slightly larger as it only excludes observations with missing 
values for variables in the independently estimated TAX and WAGE equations. 
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corporate taxes, its indirect effect being captured by the wage variable. Thus it may reflect 
that, for a given wage level, stronger unions can insist on a ‘fairer’ fiscal contribution from 
employers. In line with a standard tax competition argument, trade openness bears a negative 
relation to corporate tax rates, while the negative effect of EMU suggests that fiscal 
competition strengthens when countries join the European Union (thus generating downward 
pressure on corporate tax rates; see also Davies and Voget, 2013, and references therein). 
Higher unemployment has a similar negative effect, as predicted by Exbrayat et al. (2012). 
Finally, a higher dependency ratio tends to depress corporate tax rates. 
 
Turning to the WAGE equation, we find that, in line with expectations, union density, the 
prevalence of strikes and worker productivity are all positively associated to the wage level. 
Unemployment, on the other hand, shows a significant negative effect, presumably because 
wage demands are likely to be limited when unemployment rates are high. A similar negative 
effect is found for trade openness. The share of the population enrolled in tertiary education 
has a somewhat unexpected effect, but this might simply signal that higher education levels 
reduce the number of production workers, which reduces their (wage) bargaining power.  
____________________ 
Table 1 about here 
____________________ 
 
When we look at our key explanatory variables, Table 1 suggests that both the effect of 
corporate taxation on production workers’ wages and the effect of these wages on corporate 
tax rates are robustly negative. Yet, not accounting for reverse causality in the OLS results 
substantially biases the point estimates towards zero. Moreover, accounting for the 
simultaneity of both effects substantially improves the precision with which the coefficients 
are estimated. Overall, our preferred SUR specification shows strong support for the 
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simultaneous presence of both a direct tax incidence effect on wages (with the point estimate 
suggesting that a 1% increase in the statutory tax rate decreases wages with approximately 
$0.89) and a fiscal compensation effect (a $1 increase in wages is connected to a tax cut of 
roughly 1.02%; in line with Mittermaier and Rincke, 2013). This simultaneous empirical 
relevance of both effects is supportive of hypothesis H1. 
 
III.c The role of international capital mobility and the relative bargaining power of agents 
Table 1 follows previous work in focusing on the general relation between taxes and wages. 
Below, we extend the analysis to test the idea – stated in hypothesis H2 – that tax incidence 
and fiscal compensation effects could strengthen with the extent of international capital 
mobility. We evaluate this in two ways. First, following theoretical arguments by Harberger 
(1995), Haufler and Mittermaier (2011) and Exbrayat et al. (2012), we compare economies 
depending on the openness of their capital markets. Second, as a more indirect test, we look at 
the bargaining power of firms relative to workers. We specifically evaluate the role of 
workers’ bargaining power by relying on measures of legally entrenched worker rights 
(Rodrik, 1999), labor mobility (Ortega and Peri, 2013), and the political ideology of the ruling 
government (since left-wing parties tend to be more concerned with workers’ rights). All 
these can undermine the improved relative bargaining position of firms due to economic 
integration.14  
 
1. Capital market integration 
Economic theory predicts that a more elastic capital supply could strengthen the direct tax 
incidence and fiscal compensation effects (Harberger, 1995; Haufler and Mittermaier, 2011; 
                                                 
14 Lacking a convincing proxy for the bargaining power of governments with respect to firms (beyond size, 
which is clearly endogenous to taxation decisions), assessing the influence of firms’ and governments’ relative 
bargaining power in more detail is unfortunately unfeasible. 
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Exbrayat et al., 2012). To assess the empirical validity of this idea, we introduce a measure of 
(the absence of) capital mobility constraints. The Index of Capital Mobility Constraints 
(ICMC) from the Economic Freedom of the World database combines information about 
foreign investment restrictions (taken from the Global Competitiveness Report) and 
international capital controls (taken from the IMF) into a 10-point scale, where increasing 
numbers indicate higher capital mobility. Since interaction effects are notoriously difficult to 
specify and interpret in SUR models (as employed here), we split the sample – i.e., either at 
the mean or median level of ICMC or at the value of ICMC creating two roughly equal 
samples15 – and assess whether direct tax incidence and fiscal compensation are stronger in 
the subsample with lower constraints on capital mobility. 
____________________ 
Table 2 about here 
____________________ 
 
The results are summarized in Table 2 (suppressing control variables to preserve space). In all 
cases, we find that the coefficient estimates are more negative for the subsample of more open 
economies. This confirms hypothesis H2, according to which both the direct tax incidence and 
fiscal compensation effects become more prominent when capital supply is more elastic. It 
also complements Azémar and Hubbard’s (2015) findings regarding the determinants of 
corporate tax incidence on wages. Using BLS data for 13 OECD countries between 1980 and 
2004, they indeed show that three country characteristics contribute to raise corporate tax 
incidence on domestic wages by facilitating capital mobility: i.e. the degree of trade openness, 
the generosity of depreciation allowances, and the fact the corporate income tax is source-
based rather than residential-based. 
                                                 
15 The median ICMC value does not exactly split the sample in half, since we use the mean/median value of 
ICMC for all available observations of the index in our sample of countries and time-period, not just those in 
the estimation sample. Note also that though the sample size tends to become more constrained, using the sub-




2. Firms’ bargaining power relative to workers 
We evaluate the importance of workers’ bargaining power relative to firms via three separate 
measures. The first rests on the idea that workers’ bargaining power is strengthened when 
their rights are more firmly entrenched in a country’s legislation. We thereby follow Rodrik 
(1999) in employing the number of ILO’s eight fundamental worker rights conventions 
ratified by a country.16 Our second indicator is based on labor mobility, which is bound to 
reduce firms’ bargaining power relative to workers. Particularly, we introduce the number of 
emigrants as a percentage of the total population.17 Finally, as left-wing governments are 
more likely to defend workers than firms (compared to right-wing governments), we 
introduce a simple indicator variable for left- versus right-wing governments. As before, we 
use these indicators to split the sample in two groups with relatively strong and weak 
bargaining power for workers (with cut-offs indicated in the top row of table 3). 
____________________ 
Table 3 about here 
____________________ 
 
The results are described in Table 3. As workers’ bargaining power is expected to mainly 
affect direct tax incidence, we concentrate our interpretation predominantly on the WAGE 
equation (though we obviously need to simultaneously estimate the WAGE equation to avoid 
biased inferences, see above). Overall, we find that the depressing effect of corporate tax 
                                                 
16
 These conventions relate to fundamental principles and rights at work: i.e., freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. Data underlying this variable were obtained from: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:3533117451708198::NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_B
Y,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:2,F 
17  We are grateful to Francesc Ortega for providing us the emigration data. We should note, however, that this 
index of international migration is arguably a very crude indicator of labour mobility, as it includes the 
movement of children, retired people as well as people of working age for all sectors (not just manufacturing) 
and excludes information about the domestic mobility of labour. 
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burdens on workers’ wages is significantly stronger in the bottom half of Table 3. This holds 
for all three indicators of the strength of worker’s bargaining power (i.e., less than six or less 
than seven ILO conventions ratified, low emigration rates and the presence of a right-wing 
government). Stronger worker rights, higher worker mobility or the presence of a left-wing 
government thus indeed improve the bargaining power of workers relative to firms, leading to 
a weaker depressing effect of taxes on wages. Interestingly, this result appears to invalidate 
theoretical predictions of Arulampalam et al. (2012) and Fuest et al. (2012). One possible 
explanation, as mentioned, might lie in the exogeneity of the bargaining power of firms and 
workers in their models, as models where such bargaining power is endogenous to the level of 
economic integration provide grounds for a theoretical intuition in line with our results. 
 
Casting a brief look at the TAX equation (even though we have no strong theoretical prior 
there), we observe that strong workers are associated with a somewhat stronger tax 
compensation effect. One possible interpretation might be that a stronger position permits 
workers to demand measures from the government – such as fiscal compensation – that allow 
the country to avoid capital flight and increased unemployment following strong wage 
demands. Interestingly, such situation might lead firms to acquiesce in strong wage demands, 
as long as workers simultaneously support measures compensating these wage demands in 
terms of firms’ overall costs structure. 
 
III.d Robustness checks 
A first issue with respect to the overall robustness of our results concerns their potential 
sensitivity with respect to key variables such as corporate taxes or capital mobility. Therefore, 
we test hypotheses 1 and 2 using the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) and the Effective 
Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) levied on machinery and buildings as alternative dependent 
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variables (all tax data obtained from Loretz, 2008). As one can see from Tables 4 and 5, this 
leaves our main findings unaffected. 
____________________ 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
____________________ 
Table 6 instead employs an alternative measure for the mobility of physical capital: i.e. the 
OECD index for FDI restrictions in the manufacturing sector (with higher values indicating 
more stringent restrictions).18 Four types of measures are covered by this index: (i) foreign 
equity restrictions, (ii) screening and prior approval requirements, (iii) rules for key personnel, 
and (iv) other restrictions on the operation of foreign enterprises. The results indicate that both 
the tax incidence and fiscal compensation effects fail to reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels in the sub-sample of countries with strong restrictions (‘closed’ 
economy), but are substantively and statistically meaningful in the sub-sample of countries 
with low restrictions (‘open’ economy). This is supportive of hypothesis 2. 
____________________ 
Table 6 about here 
____________________ 
Second, one might worry about potential collinearity among our explanatory variables 
affecting our findings. Careful analysis of the pairwise correlations between our explanatory 
variables indicates moderately strong correlations (i.e. correlation above 0.4 in absolute 
terms) for four pairs of variables.19 Importantly, excluding any of these variables from the 
estimation model always leaves our findings from table 1 and table 3 unaffected (in terms of 
sign and statistical significance at conventional levels). The stronger direct tax incidence 
effect in open economies observed in table 2 likewise persists. However, the stronger fiscal 
compensation effect in open economies severely weakens when we exclude the dependency 
                                                 
18 This index is available only for the years 1997, 2003 and 2006. As variation over time appears very minimal, 
we simply take the mean the three available observations and apply the result to all years within our sample 
period. 
19 Those variable pairs are population size and trade openness (r= -0.539), education and real productivity (r= 
0.473), the dependency ratio and urbanness (r= 0.461), and population size and union density (r= -0.446). 
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ratio or workers’ real productivity as control variables. Nevertheless, this observation arises 
only when using the ICMC index as a measure of capital mobility. The result remains 
statistically significant when we instead use the OECD index of FDI restrictiveness in the 
manufacturing sector (details available upon request). 
Finally, we evaluated whether our results are sensitive to our set of countries or our approach 
to dealing with potential time-period effects. This indicates that most findings in tables 1 
through 3 are not dependent on the inclusion of any specific country. Two limited exceptions 
should be noted. First, removing the US from the sample leads to a statistically insignificant 
estimate for the direct tax incidence effect in table 1. Second, excluding Norway leads to 
statistically insignificant estimates of the WAGE coefficients in the TAX equations of both 
open and closed economies (table 2) when using the ICMC index of capital mobility. 
However, both TAX and WAGE coefficients retain a negative and statistically significant 
effect in open economies (as expected under hypothesis H2) when using OECD index of FDI 
restrictiveness or ICMC sub-index based on restrictions of FDI. Such a limited number of 
deviations can be expected given the substantial number of statistical tests involved in this 
replication exercise (type II error). Moreover, excluding the US does not affect our findings in 
tables 2 and 3, while removing Norway does not influence the inferences from tables 1 and 3 
(or those related to the fiscal compensation effect in table 2). Hence, we feel that our results 
are, on the whole, quite robust to the specific estimation sample employed (details available 
upon request). 
Our results are also largely robust to using country-specific period effects rather than year 
effects. Specifically, we created indicator variables for the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s and 
interacted these with the country-level dummy variables. Adding these variables leaves our 
baseline findings in tables 1 and 3 qualitatively unaffected. With respect to the influence of 
capital mobility (table 2), our results are again robust when using the OECD index of FDI 
 22 
restrictiveness or the ICMC sub-index based on restrictions of FDI (though they substantially 
weaken when using the general ICMC measure; details available upon request). 
 
IV. Conclusion  
This article provided empirical evidence for a two-way relationship between wages and 
corporate taxation at the international level over the period 1982-2007. We find that: i) 
governments compensate firms for high labor costs through lower corporate taxation and ii) 
firms pass their fiscal burden on to workers through lower wages. Crucially, both 
relationships are found to be significantly stronger when capital market integration is stronger. 
Finally, and contrary to existing theoretical predictions, we provide evidence that corporate 
tax incidence on domestic wages is decreasing with the relative bargaining power of workers 
relative to firms. As existing models treating the bargaining power of firms and workers as 
exogenous cannot explain this observation, this finding calls for theoretical models of 
corporate tax incidence allowing the relative bargaining power of economic agents to be 
endogenous to economic integration (in spirit of Eckel and Egger, 2009). 
 
These results have important theoretical as well as practical implications. Indeed, the tax-
induced capital outflow that drives the race-to-the-bottom result in the tax competition 
literature is challenged. Indeed, corporate tax cuts might be ineffective in preventing capital 
outflows once we take into account the possibility that the labor cost subsequently adjusts 
upwards. This would be especially the case when firms are more responsive to labor cost than 
to taxes. In such a situation, we could obtain a race to-the-top rather than a race-to-the-bottom 
in taxes if governments compete by raising taxes to improve the attractiveness of their country 
through a lower labor cost. A recent paper by Lockwood and Makris (2006) takes a first step 
toward this direction. They incorporate tax-shifting, heterogeneity between agents within 
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countries and a majority rule decision-making process in a Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) 
tax competition model. Doing so, capital mobility induces a tax incidence effect, which makes 
that Nash taxes are higher than in a closed economy. 
 
In this respect, it is important to note that the existence of significant (direct) corporate tax 
incidence on wages also calls for a new welfare analysis regarding tax competition. Indeed, 
the fiscal competition literature often argues that strategic interactions are harmful for 
immobile workers. The intuition for this result is that governments shift part of the tax burden 
onto workers because their labor supply elasticity is finite (Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). 
Our empirical results suggest that, depending on the tax base elasticity in the presence of 
corporate tax incidence, workers might be either harmed, better off or unaffected by tax 
competition. Thus, policy recommendations regarding tax competition need to be 
reconsidered by taking into account the potential ability for firms to pass their fiscal burden 
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Table 1: Baseline estimation results 
 
Dep. Var. 
OLS OLS SUR 





- -1.024 *** 
(-4.93) 
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Productivity - 0.0004 ** 
(1.99) 







































Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the statutory corporate income tax rate (TAX) and the real 
hourly compensation cost of production workers in the manufacturing sector (WAGE). The first four 
columns estimate both equations independently via OLS, whereas the last two columns implement a SUR 
approach to account for simultaneity. The second set of OLS results only differs from the first set in terms 
of the sample employed (i.e. it matches the sample used in the SUR regressions). The sample size in the 
SUR estimates is lower than the first set of OLS estimates due to the exclusion of all observations with 
missing values for any variable included in either equation (whereas the first set of OLS estimates only 
excludes observations with missing values for variables in the independently estimated equations). t-
statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for country-level clustering, between brackets; ***,**, * 




Table 2: Results depending on capital mobility 
 
Dep. Var. 
Cut-off = Mean ICMC Cut-off = Median ICMC Equal-split sample 
TAX WAGE TAX WAGE TAX WAGE 










- -1.392 *** 
(-3.67) 
- -1.461 *** 
(-3.53) 


















































- -0.318 *** 
(-3.09) 
- -0.355 *** 
(-3.24) 






































Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the statutory corporate income tax rate (TAX) and the real 
hourly compensation cost of production workers in the manufacturing sector (WAGE). All models are 
based on a SUR approach to account for simultaneity. t-statistics between brackets; ***,**, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All controls included as in Table 1. Mean and median 
ICMC are 5.999 and 6.4, respectively. For equal-split sample cut-off for ICMC is set at 7.599. 
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Table 3: Results depending on worker’s rights 
 
Dep. Var. 
Cut-off = 6 conventions Cut-off = 7 conventions Cut-off = Median 
Emigration 
Left versus right gvt. 
TAX WAGE TAX WAGE TAX WAGE TAX WAGE 
‘strong’ workers         
WAGE -0.868 *** 
(-2.70) 




- -3.184 *** 
(-4.66) 
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WAGE -0.819 
(-0.19) 
- -0.858 *** 
(-2.98) 





TAX - -0.764 *** 
(-4.11) 
- -0.923 *** 
(-5.24) 
- -2.207 *** 
(-2.41) 


















































Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the statutory corporate income tax rate (TAX) and the real 
hourly compensation cost of production workers in the manufacturing sector (WAGE). All models are 
based on a SUR approach to account for simultaneity. The median emigration share in the sample is 
0.00152. t-statistics between brackets; ***,**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All 
controls included as in Table 1.  
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Appendix: Data sources and summary statistics 
WAGE: Hourly Compensation cost in manufacturing in real US dollar (source: BLS).   
TAX: Statutory Tax Rate (source: Loretz, 2008).   
Population: Total population, in thousands (source: World Bank Development Indicators) 
Left-wing gov: Coded -1 if left, 1 if right, 0 if center (source: World Bank: Database of 
Political Institutions). 
Majority gov: Fraction of seats held by the government minus 50% (source: World Bank: 
Database of Political Institutions). 
Gov. expenditures: Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 
current prices (source: Penn World Tables). 
EMU: dummy = 1 if the country (or its predecessors) is member of EMU. 
Dependency ratio: Age dependency ratio, in % of working-age population (source: World 
Bank Development Indicators). 
Education: School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) (source: World Bank Development 
Indicators).  
Unemployment: Unemployment rate, in % (source: International Labour Organization, Labour 
Statistics) 
Dependency ratio: Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population). 
Openness: Trade openness (source: Penn World Tables). 
Union density: Union Density (source: OECD labour force statistics) 
Strikes: Total number of strikes and lockouts (source: International Labour Organization, 
Labour Statistics). 
Productivity: GDP per person engaged (constant 1990 US$ at PPP) (source: International 
Labour Organization, Labour Statistics). 
Urbanness: proportion of population living in urban areas (source: World Bank Development 
Indicators). 
ICMC: Index of Capital Mobility Constraints (source: Economic Freedom of the World). 
Workers’ rights: number of ILO’s eight fundamental worker rights conventions ratified by a 
country (source: International Labour Organization). 
Emigration share: Number of emigrants as a percentage of the total population (source: 
Ortega and Peri, 2013). 
FDI index: FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index in the manufacturing sector (source: OECD)  
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Summary statistics (1982-2007) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
WAGE 2.36 17.553     7.211        41.044 
TAX 36.648      10.734                   10 65 
Population 36093.73          53172.14 228.16 311666 
Left-wing gvt. 0.421               0.494 0 1 
Majority gvt. 0.079         0.135  -0.245 0.5 
Gov. expenditures 9.237                2.717 2.6 16.99 
EMU 0.456 0. 498 0 1 
Dependency ratio 51.262        6.949 38.147 94.244 
Education 41.79039        21.29972 1.44493 98.09171 
Unemployment 7.180           3.985 1 23.9 
Openness 73.373            43.666 13.76 324.36 
Union Density 37.423      21.525 5.797 96.355 
Strikes 411.952       825.762 0 12765 
































EATR WAGE EMTR WAGE 
WAGE -0.005 *** 
(-3.09) 
- -0.004 ** 
(-2.14) 
- 




EMTR - - - -76.074 *** 
(-4.00) 
Year Dummies 
























Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the effective average or effective 
marginal corporate income tax rate (EATR and EMTR) and the real hourly 
compensation cost of production workers in the manufacturing sector (WAGE). 
Estimated coefficients derive from a SUR approach to account for simultaneity. t-
statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for country-level clustering, between 
brackets; ***,**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness Capital Mobility and Worker Rights results to operationalisation of TAX 
 
Dep. Var. 
 ICMC Equal-split sample ICMC Equal-split sample Cut-off = 7 conventions Cut-off = 7 conventions 
EATR WAGE EMTR WAGE EATR WAGE EMTR WAGE 
 ‘open’ economy ‘open’ economy ‘strong’ workers ‘strong’ workers 
WAGE -0.009 * 
(-1.91) 
- -0.016 *** 
(-2.68) 
- -0.009 *** 
(-2.76) 
- -0.009 *** 
(-2.63) 
- 
EATR - -79.17 *** 
(-3.07) 




EMTR - - - -30.872 * 
(-1.92) 






























































- -0.014 *** 
(-4.27) 
- -0.022 *** 
(-4.25) 
- 
EATR - -37.921 ** 
(-2.11) 






- - - -28.424 * 
(-1.89) 
















































Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the statutory corporate income tax rate (TAX) and the real hourly compensation 
cost of production workers in the manufacturing sector (WAGE). All models are based on a SUR approach to account for 
simultaneity. t-statistics between brackets; ***,**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All controls 
included as in Table 1. The equal-split sample cut-off for ICMC is set at 7.599. 
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Table 6: Robustness capital mobility results  
 
Dep. Var. 
Cut-off = Mean FDI index Cut-off = Median or 
equal-split FDI index 
TAX WAGE TAX WAGE 
‘open’ economy     











































































Note: The dependent variables are, respectively, the statutory corporate income tax rate 
(TAX) and the real hourly compensation cost of production workers in the 
manufacturing sector (WAGE). All models are based on a SUR approach to 
account for simultaneity. t-statistics between brackets; ***,**, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All controls included as in Table 1. 
Mean and median FDI index are 0.0424 and 0.001, respectively. For equal-split 
sample cut-off for FDI index is set at 0 and yields identical results as the median 
FDI index.  
 
 
 
 
